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Abstract: We argue that personal (e.g., age, gender and education) and circumstantial 
(e.g., bureaucratic rank and sector of employment) factors affect the cost and the 
benefit of bribe-taking by the bureaucrats.  The bureaucrat’s bribe-taking decision is 
modeled.  A unique data set is used to test the predictions of the model.  The 
empirical findings include that education reduces, but power (measured by rank and 
sector of work) increases, the magnitude of bribe-taking.  Age affects bribe-taking in 
a more subtle way.  Gender does not affect it in a statistically significant way.  Our 
study of corruption at the individual level complements the literature studying 
corruption at country and industry levels.   
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1. Introduction  
Corruption is an old and worldwide phenomenon with a severe detrimental 
effect on social justice and economic development.1  A large literature has been 
developed to study the phenomenon.   
Much of the literature tries to identify factors correlated to aggregate severity 
of corruption at the country level.  Among factors found negatively related to the 
degree of aggregate corruption are a country’s per capita income level, income level 
of civil service employees, openness to foreign trade, protestant tradition, history of 
British rule, freedom of the press, fiscal decentralization, parliamentary system, and 
history of democratic institution.2  Additionally, racial fractionalization and income 
inequality are found to be positively, but education negatively, related to the severity 
of corruption in a state, historically in the United States (Glaeser and Saks, 2005).   
A smaller body of the literature has been devoted to identifying factors and 
mechanisms leading to corruption.  In this literature, the prevailing view, e.g., Leff 
(1964), Becker (1968), Becker and Stigler (1974), Krueger (1974), Rose-Ackerman 
(1975, 1978), is that corruption in the form of rent seeking is primarily a product of 
politician’s regulatory power.  Supporting this view, Khwaja and Mian (2005) find 
that, when borrowing from government-controlled banks, politically-connected firms 
are likely to borrow more and later default.  Svensson (2003) shows that the amount 
                                                        
1 Studies by Bardhan (1997), Mauro (1995), Johnson et al. (1997, 2000), Kaufman et al. 
(2002), Wei (2000), Wei and Shleifer (2000), Li, Xu, and Zou (2000), Alam (1990) and 
Murphy et al. (1991, 1993) find that corruption hinders economic growth, lowers investment, 
increases inequality in income distribution, and causes the expansion of unofficial economy.    
2 See Ades and Di Tella (1999), Friedman et al. (2000), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Knack and 
Azfar (2000), Kunicova (2001), Lederman et al. (2001), Treisman (2000), Wei (2000), Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) and Serra (2006).     
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of bribe paid by a firm to politicians is related to its ability to pay and “refusal power”.  
Also consistent with the rent-seeking theory, Clarke and Xu (2004) find that capacity 
constraint, market power and state ownership are factors contributing to accepting 
bribes by employees in the utility sector.   
This paper is another effort to understand factors and mechanisms leading to 
corruption, specifically in the form of bribe-taking by the government bureaucrat 
(hereon referred to as “agent”).  A unique feature of our study is that it focuses on 
individual level factors, i.e., personal (age, gender and education) and circumstantial 
(the rank and sector of employment) and analyze their effects on the rational agent’s 
bribe-taking decisions.  By studying the effects of these individual level factors, we 
aim to fill two gaps in the literature studying corruption. 
The first gap in the literature which we fill is to build a rational model of the 
agent’s bribe-taking decisions.  In the model, bribe-taking is a two-step sequential 
decision problem.  In the problem, the agent first decides if it is worthwhile to take 
bribes.  If the answer is positive, the agent then proceeds to decide how much bribe 
to take.  While taking bribes has obvious benefit, it also involves some potential 
costs.  If caught taking a bribe, the agent will have to bear some direct (financial, 
legal and possibly other) cost and the opportunity cost of losing the career in the 
bureaucratic system.3  Personal and circumstantial factors affect the bribe-taking 
decisions (i.e., the “whether or not” decision and the “how much” decision) because 
they affect the cost-benefit analyses involved in these decisions.   
                                                        
3 Olken (2007) shows that, in village road construction projects, increased auditing by 
government and independent cost estimation by engineers help to reduce corruption.   
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So far, empirical studies of corruption have been mainly at country and 
industry levels.  The reason for this bias in the literature is easy to understand: the 
nature of the research makes it difficult to obtain individual level data.  By using this 
unique individual-level data set to study the agent’s bribe-taking decisions, we fill 
another gap in the literature.  
The data we use are from the website of the Ministry of Supervision, the 
People’s Republic of China, which contains information of 130 corrupt government 
officials.  The information is detailed on personal and work-related variables of these 
corrupt officials, such as age, gender, education, office, rank, and the geographic 
location of work.  Three groups of major findings emerged from the study.   
First, the study finds that, circumstantial factors do affect bribe-taking as 
predicted by our model.  In particular, the magnitudes of bribes taken are found 
positively related to the ranks of the agents, to the resource-allocating power and to 
the personnel power of the offices in which the agents work.  We see this as 
individual-level evidence supporting rent-seeking theory as in Leff (1964), Becker 
(1968), Becker and Stigler (1974), Krueger (1974), Rose-Ackerman (1975, 1978).   
Second, the study finds that personal factors, e.g., age and education, do affect 
bribe-taking, again as predicted by our model.  Specifically, education has the effect 
of alleviating bribe-taking.  The effect of age also seems significant, although the 
way it affects bribe-taking is more subtle.   
The third group of our findings is that general economic conditions, e.g., per 
capita income in an area, economic growth rate, degree of economic openness of a 
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province, also has a negative effect on corruption.4   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 introduces a rational 
model of the government bureaucrat’s bribe-taking decision.  Section 3 explains the 
data and provides some descriptive statistics.  Section 4 reports the main empirical 
findings.  Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The Model.  
Bribe-taking is assumed to be a decision independently and rationally made by 
individual agents.  The agent makes the decision based on a cost-benefit analysis in 
order to maximize his/her expected utility.  Affecting the analysis are personal and 
circumstantial factors to be specified as follows.  
On the benefit side, let mi be the measure of the gain that agent i obtains from 
taking a bribe, mi>0 and i=1,2,…I.  It is believable that this gain is positively related 
to the significance of the favor that the agent does to the bribing party.  Furthermore, 
the magnitude of the favor an agent can do to a bribing party is likely to have an upper 
limit determined by the power of the office in which the agent works.  Factors 
determining the power of an office include financial and/or natural resources that the 
office controls, personnel decisions that the office makes, etc.  Let ( )i jm x be the 
upper limit of the benefit that agent i in office j can possibly obtain from taking a 
                                                        
4 This group of factors is not considered in our theoretic model.  However, they are 
considered in previous work of country- and industry-level empirical studies of 
corruption.  We include them in our empirical study to control them.  It is very 
interesting that, even though the data used in our study are at individual level and 
from another country in a different time of history than those in Glaeser and Saks 
(2005), the findings on these commonly included variables are quite consistent. 
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bribe, where xj is the measure of power in an office and j=1, 2…J.  Based on the 
above discussion, we assume ( ) 0i jdm d x > .  For notational simplicity, in the rest 
of the paper, we will use mij in place of ( )i jm x , which means that mi is in the range of 
mij>mi>0. 
Bribe-taking also has its costs.  Assume that, if an agent is caught taking a 
bribe, mi is completely lost and an additional punishment of size c is inflicted on i.  c 
could be a fine or confiscated property beyond mi.  c could also be interpreted as the 
monetary equivalence of all the mental and physical sufferings resulting from other 
forms of punishment, e.g., humiliation, a jail term, etc.  It is reasonable to assume a 
non-negative relationship between c and mi, i.e., an agent does not receive a lighter 
punishment for taking a larger bribe.  When interpreting c as reflecting mental and 
physical sufferings, it is reasonable to believe that certain personal factors may matter.  
For example, an older agent expecting fewer years left in life may have a smaller c.  
The agent might also receive a more lenient legal treatment for age-related reasons, 
e.g., medical needs.  Let yi be the set of all personal factors affecting c.  The above 
discussions imply c(mi, yi).  Assume c(mi, yi)>0 and ( , ) / 0i i ic m y m∂ ∂ > .  We also 
assume ( , ) / 0i i ic m y y∂ ∂ <  to indicate the impact of personal factors.  If yi is age, 
for example, 2 ( , ) / 0i i i ic m y m y∂ ∂ ∂ <  means that ( , ) /i i ic m y m∂ ∂ is smaller for an 
older agent at any given value of mi. 
If caught, a bribe-taking agent also suffers the opportunity cost of losing the 
current position in government and the right to continue in the promotion tournament 
(as in Lazear and Rosen, 1981).  Let u be the agent’s discounted present value of 
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holding the government position and continuing the promotion tournament from there.  
The value of u is likely different across agents because of different preferences.  
Even if we assume identical preferences, still, discounted present values are likely to 
vary across agents due to personal factors affecting how far and how fast an agent is 
likely to be promoted, such as education, age, and gender. Under the assumption of 
identical preferences, which is made to facilitate this analysis, we can write u(yi) 
where yi is a vector of personal factors affecting agent i’s promotion prospect.  For 
notational simplicity, from here on we will use ui in place of u(yi).  Keep in mind that 
the subscript in ui stands for personal factors rather than preference of agent i.   
Assume that the possibility of catching a corrupt agent is 0<p<1.  The value 
of p is likely dependent on circumstantial factors such as government’s determination 
and effort to fight corruption and institutions facilitating the purpose.  To keep the 
study manageable without compromising its main purpose, in this paper p is assumed 
to be exogenously given.   
At probability (1-p), a bribe-taking agent may not be caught.  In such a case, 
the agent receives the gain mi (<mij) and continues in the promotion tournament.  
The total value obtained by the agent is thus (mi+ui).  If caught, which happens at 
probability p, the agent loses mi and ui and suffers punishment c(mi, yi).  The 
weighted average of these two possibilities is the expected value to an agent who 
chooses to be corrupt,  
 ( ) (1 )( ) ( , )i i i i iv m p m u pc m y= − + − .           (1) 
The agent can also choose to be completely clean refusing to take any bribe.  
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In such a case, the agent expects to receive ui.  Thus, the agent makes the decision 
whether to take bribery or not to maximize his/her utility: 
( ){ }*max ,max ( ) max ,
i
i i i i
m
u v m u v m
⎧ ⎫ =⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
, where ( )* arg maxi im v m= . 
It is incentive compatible for a risk-neutral agent to be corrupt when 
    * *(1 )( ) ( , )i i i i iu p m u pc m y≤ − + − .   
Otherwise, the agent stays clean.  
This inequality can be rewritten as 
* *((1 ) / ) ( , )i i i iu p p m c m y≤ − −        (2) 
Obviously, for the study to be meaningful, we need to assume that c and p are 
sufficiently small, i.e., c < C < ∞ and p < P < 1, where C and P are two scalars.  
Otherwise, there would never be corruption because Inequality (2) is never satisfied 
since we have assumed ui > 0.     
The agent’s optimization problem is to choose between   
     0,  if Inequality (2) is satisfied; 
mi  =｛ 
     mi*,   if Inequality (2) is not satisfied. 
Note that, in this optimization problem, the agent has two decisions to make.  One of 
them is a qualitative “yes or no” decision, i.e., whether or not to take bribes.  The 
other is a quantitative “how much” decision, i.e., if it is worthwhile to be corrupt, 
what is the optimal amount of bribe to take.   
From Inequality (2), we can see that the agent will say “no” to corruption if 
the current position brings the agent a very high discounted present value ui relative to 
expected gain from corruption (1-p)mi, or if expected cost of corruption pc is very 
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high.  Under these conditions, Inequality (2) is not satisfied for any value of mi.  
This suggests that an agent with favorable personal factors, e.g., good education and 
right age, for future promotions (a large ui) and little power (a small mij) will not be 
corrupt. 
Another situation in which the agent will say “no” to corruption is when the 
value of ( , ) /i i ic m y m∂ ∂  is high for all mi relative to that of (1-p).  When this is true, 
( ) (1 ) ( , ) /i i i iv m p p c m y m′ = − − ∂ ∂ <0 for all mi.  Then v is maximal at mi=0.  This 
suggests that, through their modifying effect on ( , ) /i i ic m y m∂ ∂ , personal factors 
contained in yi again affects the agent’s corruption decision.   
When it is worthwhile to be corrupt, i.e., when there is value of mi at which 
Inequality (2) is satisfied, the agent proceeds to makes a quantitative decision on 
how much bribe to take.  The agent makes this decision by solving the problem 
described by Equation (1).   
Without further restrictions on the values of p and ( , ) /i i ic m y m∂ ∂  except that 
( , ) /i i ic m y m∂ ∂ exists and its value is continuous, corner and interior solutions are both 
possible.  In case ( )iv m′ >0 for all mi, v is the largest at mi=mij.  The solution is 
mi*=mij. ( )iv m′ >0 for all mi would be true if (1-p) is sufficiently large and 
( , ) /i i ic m y m∂ ∂  sufficiently small for all mi.  Recall our earlier discussion of possible 
reasons leading to the assumption of 2 ( , ) /i i i ic m y m y∂ ∂ ∂ , e.g., marginal cost 
( , ) /i i ic m y m∂ ∂ is smaller for an older agent at any given value of mi.  This means that 
personal factors can lead to the result of mi*=mij.  Note also that, when the agent 
does choose mi*=mij, the amount of bribe the agent takes is a direct function of the 
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circumstantial factors determining the power of the agent’s office (in terms of 
resources controlled or personnel decisions made by the office), such as the agent’s 
rank in the bureaucratic system and the branch of government.   
If p is not too close to unit or zero, ( , ) /i i ic m y m∂ ∂  is monotonic, sufficiently 
small at mi=0 and sufficiently large at mi=mij, an interior solution is found where 
  * *( ) (1 ) ( , ) / 0,i i i iv m p p c m y m′ = − − ∂ ∂ =  0<mi*<mij. 
Note that the same conditions leading to this result would also assure the 
satisfaction of the second-order condition for the existence of mi*.  In this case, 
personal factors affect the (quantitative) decision of bribe taking through their impact 
on the marginal cost of corruption to the agent.  
To summarize, our model has the following predictions on how personal and 
circumstantial factors affects the agent’s qualitative and quantitative decisions on 
bribe taking.  Predictions 1 and 2 concern the occurrence of corruption, while 
predictions 3 and 4 the amount of bribe taken if corruption.  
Prediction 1: With everything else given, the agent decides to take bribes when 
personal factors are such that they sufficiently reduce the agent’s opportunity cost ui.  
Therefore, statistically, we should observe more corruption in agents with less 
favorable personal conditions for promotion.   
This prediction is from Inequality (2).  When ui is sufficiently small, 
Inequality (2) is satisfied.  Examples of potentially unfavorable personal factors, i.e., 
factors reducing an agent’s odd of future promotions and thus the value of ui, include 
less education, age close to retirement and sex in the discriminated category.  
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Prediction 2: With everything else given and ( , ) /i i ic m y m∂ ∂  not too large, the agent 
become corrupt when circumstantial factors provide the agent sufficient power.  
Therefore, statistically, we should observe more corruption among agents in higher 
ranks and in more important offices. 
The prediction is made on the first-order condition for mi* from Equation (1) 
and Inequality (2).  Greater power means a higher upper limit mij.  When c(mi, yi) 
does not increase too fast in mi, this means that the right-hand side of Inequality (1) 
has a larger value when circumstantial factors grant the agent greater power.   
Prediction 3: Among those who take bribes, agents with personal factors leading to 
lower values of ( , ) /i i ic m y m∂ ∂ are more corrupt.  Therefore, statistically, we should 
observe a correlation between the degree of corruption and factors leading to lower 
marginal cost of corruption.   
This prediction is made on the first-order condition from Equation (1). 
Suppose that an agent finds it worthwhile to take bribes and has an interior solution 
with regard to how much bribe to take.  When the value of yi is such that it lowers 
( , ) /i i ic m y m∂ ∂  for all mi, a large mi* is needed to satisfy the first-order condition.  
The statistic prediction is obviously true if all corrupt agents have interior mi*s.  It 
remains true if at least some of the corrupt agents have interior solutions, although we 
can expect a weaker statistic relationship between mi* and personal factors leading to 
lower values of ( , ) /i i ic m y m∂ ∂ .  
How personal factors affect the value of ( , ) /i i ic m y m∂ ∂  is mostly an empirical 
question.  We mentioned before that a personal factor reducing the value of 
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( , ) /i i ic m y m∂ ∂  is old age which means fewer years left to suffer the consequences of 
being caught corrupt and likely more lenient sentences.  However, one could counter 
argue, for example, that younger age means that the agent is less fearful so that the 
subjective ( , ) /i i ic m y m∂ ∂ is smaller in the cost calculation.  In the end, it is an 
empirical question as to how age affects the degree of corruption among the corrupt 
agents.   
Another factor that can potentially affect the value of ( , ) /i i ic m y m∂ ∂  is the 
agent’s education.  While official rules do not consider education when inflicting a 
penalty on a corrupt agent, psychologically, the cost of the same punishment may be 
different across agents of different educational levels due to the effect of education on 
an individual’s values and belief.5 
Prediction 4: Among those who take bribes, agents with greater power are more 
corrupt.  Therefore, statistically, we should observe a positive correlation of the 
degree of corruption with more favorable circumstantial factors affecting power, e.g., 
agents working in more powerful branches and/or in higher ranks are more corrupt.  
This prediction is obviously true if all corrupt agents have corner solutions, i.e., 
personal and circumstantial factors are such that ( ) 0iv m′ >  is true for all of them.  
If, among the agents who are corrupt, some of them have corner but others interior 
solutions, the overall correlation between power and the degree of corruption is 
                                                        
5 This point is due to Brian Viard, who further suggested a possible way to test the effect of 
education on a person’s value and belief.  Suppose that data allow us to separate agents who 
earned their diplomas, e.g., those had had good education before they became government 
bureaucrats, and those who purchased their diplomas, e.g., those who entered educational 
programs after they have become powerful and never showed up in classes.  If education 
does affect an agent’s value and belief, everything else equal, among all corrupt agents, we 
should observe more severe corruption among the latter group of agents.  Otherwise, 
education affects corruption only through its impact on an agent’s promotion opportunity.  
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weakened, but it will not disappear.  So we should still statistically observe it. 
It is worthwhile to note that Predictions 1 and 2 above are about the agents’ 
qualitative decisions, i.e., to say “yes” or “no” to corruption, while Predictions 3 and 4 
are quantitative about corrupt agents’ quantitative decisions, i.e., how much bribes to 
take.   
In the empirical effort that we will next make to test the effects of personal and 
circumstantial factors on bribe taking, data do not allow us to test how either set of 
factors affects the agent’s qualitative decision of saying “yes” or “no” to corruption. 
To test the “yes” or “no” prediction, we would need data of all bureaucrats, corrupt or 
clean, in different age, education and gender groups, as well as in different offices 
(ranks, government branches and locations).  Without data of such information, we 
have no choice but to leave the task to future research.  The data we have, however, 
do allow us to test the effect of personal and circumstantial factors on the quantitative 
decision of corruption, i.e., how much bribe to take, among agents who are corrupt.  
We thus will focus on testing Predictions 3 and 4 in the remainder of the paper.   
 
3. Data 
We collected data of 130 corrupt government officials published on the website of 
the Ministry of Supervision, People of Republic of China.  The chief function of the 
Ministry of Supervision is to monitor government employees and investigate their 
misconducts.  Taking bribery is a severe misconduct.  Other severe misconducts 
include embezzlement and misuse of government funds, and dereliction of duty 
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leading to significant consequences.  Severe misconducts that consist of crimes will 
be further prosecuted and sentenced.  
We focus on bribery cases as taking bribes is a primary indicator of rent seeking.  
From this website, we found the total of 130 cases where agents were prosecuted for 
taking bribes.  These cases were prosecuted in 2003 through 2006.  The website 
contains information of an agent’s age, gender, education, rank, the government 
division, and the province and city in which the agent worked and the amount of 
bribery accepted.  We also searched other newspapers and media reports to 
supplement missing data for some agents.  The data on provincial per capital GDP 
and GDP growth, imports and exports and foreign direct investment (FDI) are from 
Chinese Statistics Yearbooks of various years.  These provincial data are merged 
with the data obtained from the Ministry of Supervision’s website.  
In Tables 1, 2 and 4, we divide these agents into different groups by their personal 
and circumstantial characteristics, e.g., age, gender, education, bureaucratic ranks.  
We then provide descriptive statistics of the average amounts of bribery accepted by 
the agents in each group.  As shown in Table 1, as predicted by our model, the oldest 
age group (55 and up) is the most corrupt measured by the average amount of bribery 
accepted.  Somewhat surprising is the fact that the youngest group (age 36 and 
below) is also very corrupt, with a larger average amount of bribery than those taken 
by other age groups.  This would be consistent with our model if at the beginning of 
a bureaucratic career the opportunity cost of losing a government position is not as 
large as in mid-careers.  Also consistent with the model is the fact that the average 
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bribery amount declines with education.  Males had a higher amount than that taken 
by females.  In general, descriptive statistics in Table 1 show clearly that personal 
factors are important determinants of an individual agent’s corruption decisions.  
Statistics in Table 2 describe the connection between bureaucratic rank and 
corruption.  In ascending order, the bureaucratic ranks are Ke (section head); Chu  
minus (Fu-Chu, i.e., deputy division or department head); Chu (i.e., division or 
department head); Ting (or Ju) Minus (Fu-Ting or Fu-Ju, i.e., deputy bureau head); 
Ting (or Ju, i.e., bureau head); Sheng (or Bu) Minus (Fu-Sheng or Fu-Bu, i.e., deputy 
governor or minister); and Sheng (or Bu, i.e., governor or minister).  Bureaucrats 
holding the rank of Sheng or Bu are either the governor of a province or head of a 
ministry in the central government.  Mayors of major cities in a province (excluding 
Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqin and Tianjin), a head of a ministry in the provincial 
government, and a department head in the central government would have the rank of 
Ting or Ju.  Li and Zhou (2005) had a detailed explanation of the cadre rank system 
in the Chinese government.  As shown in Table 2, consistent with the prediction of 
the model, agents at the Ting (or Ju) and above levels take significantly higher 
average amounts of bribery.  However, the relationship between rank and average 
amount of bribery is not linear.  On average, a deputy head at a higher rank would 
take a much smaller amount of bribery than a head at the rank below.  This is not 
inconsistent with our model, if we realize that being a deputy head usually means 
significantly diminished power in an office.   
To show rent seeking in different government divisions, we first introduce the 
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organization of government in China.  Main government ministries and departments 
are listed in Table 3 along with their major functions and regulatory authority.  This 
information is obtained from the website of various ministries.  The organizational 
structure of government at the provincial or city level is similar to that at the central 
level.  Because of small number of observations in certain ministries, we group 
ministries by their functions and authority.  
Lu (2000) has vividly described corruption in different areas of government 
administration in China.  For example, highway constructions are very lucrative 
programs.  As government does not have sufficient funds to build highways, it 
allows private capital in the industry.  Once a highway is constructed, the private 
investor can charge a toll on the users.  The toll collection not only covers the cost 
but also gains a large amount of profit for the investor.  Thus, government officials 
in the transportation department who hold the authority to assign and approve 
highway construction projects are usually main targets of rent-seeking investors.   
As Table 4 shows, the transportation and commerce divisions had a larger amount 
of bribery taking than other ministries and divisions.  The planning and auditing 
department in charge of economic planning and internal auditing had taken the lowest 
average amount of bribery.  Overall, the results show that the average amount of 
bribery taken is quite different in different government divisions, suggesting different 
degrees of power and rent to be sought.   
4. Regression Results 
The main regression results are reported in Table 5 where the group of individual 
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characteristics, bureaucratic rank, government divisions, and provincial economic 
development variables are added into the regression in the stepwise fashion.  The 
first group of variables consists of age, education, and gender dummies.  These 
results are reported in specification (1) of Table 5.  These results show that, overall, 
the differences in the average bribery amounts across age groups are not statistically 
significant.  The gender difference is not significant either.  On the other hand, the 
differences among education groups are evident.  The average amount of bribery 
declined with the level of educational attainment.  
In the next step, dummy variables of bureaucratic ranks are added to the 
regression. The results are shown in column 2 of Table 5.  One concern is that age 
and education may be correlated with rank, as would be true if seniority is a factor 
affecting promotion.  We undertake several measures to investigate how serious the 
multicollinearity problem is and to what extent the regression estimates are affected 
by it.  First, we estimate an ordered logit model of bureaucratic rank determination 
(Please see Appendix Table).  The dependent variable is the categorical variable that 
takes the value from 1 to 6, which indicate the rank in the ascending order, Ke; Chu 
minus; Chu; Ting(or Ju) Minus; Ting (or Ju); Sheng (or Bu) Minus and above.  
Explanatory variables are age, gender, and education dummies.  Age and education 
are significant predictors of bureaucratic ranks, whereas gender is not.  Nevertheless, 
pseudo R2 of the ordered logit regression is 0.11, suggesting that there is still large 
variation in bureaucratic ranks that cannot be explained by age and education. 
Secondly, we compare R2 of the restricted and unrestricted models, i.e. model (1) and 
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(2) in Table 5.  Model (1) has a very small R2 (0.015).  When the dummies of 
bureaucratic ranks are added in, R2 increases to 0.22.  If age and education are highly 
correlated with rank, we would not have seen such a large increase in R2.  Finally, 
we calculated Variance Inflation factors (VIF) for model (2).  On average, VIF 
equals 2.34 for age, education, and rank dummies.  Typically, when VIF is above 10, 
it is considered strong evidence of multicollinearity.  All above three pieces of 
evidence suggest that multicollinearity may not be a serious problem.  Thus, the 
inference based on the estimates of model (2) is largely valid and informative.  The 
estimates show that the average amount of bribery increases significantly with 
bureaucratic ranks.  Also, we see changes in the estimates of age and education 
variables from model (1) to (2).  The estimate of the youngest age group (Age 35 
and below) increases from model (1) to (2) and becomes significantly positive.  This 
suggests that the lower bribery amount of young bureaucrats, as shown in column (1), 
is mostly due to their low political rank.  When rank is controlled, they have a 
significantly higher bribery amount.  Similarly, bureaucrats with a higher education 
level tend to have a higher rank.  When rank is controlled, the average amount of 
bribery of those with a higher education level becomes lower.  
In the third step, we add in the group of government division dummies.  F-test 
results cannot reject that the estimates of different government departments are the 
same.  However, we do see that the coefficient estimates of transportation, finance, 
and core departments are significantly higher than the base group (i.e. the planning 
and auditing department). 
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Finally, provincial economic variables are included in the estimation.  In addition 
to per capita GDP and growth rate, we also included variables of percentages of 
private sector, foreign direct investment and import and export in a provincial 
economy.  The percentage of private sector is measured by the number of workers 
working in the private sector as percentage of total employment in a province.  This 
variable is considered as a proxy of degree of economic freedom.  FDI and 
import/export are the proxies of the degree of openness of a provincial economy.  
They turned out to be highly correlated with the provincial growth rate.  Therefore, 
in Table 5, we exclude them.  However, separate regressions are estimated with FDI 
and import/export included in place of the growth rate.  The results show that the 
share of the private sector is significantly associated with corruption, with a larger 
share of private economy associated with less corruption.  
5. Conclusion 
 We have theoretically and empirically studied the determinants of rent seeking by 
individual government officials, with rent measured by the amount of bribery taken 
by a bureaucrat.   
In the study, we used two groups of explanatory variables.  In the first group are 
personal factors, i.e., age, gender and education. In the second group are institutional 
factors, i.e., bureaucratic rank, government division and provincial economic 
variables.  The linkage between these variables and rent seeking was first discussed 
in the theoretic model.   
 The empirical findings may be summarized as follows.  First and foremost, 
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bureaucratic rank is the most important predictor of corruption, with corruption more 
severe among higher-ranking government officials.  Second, some government 
divisions such as transportation and finance are more corrupt.  Third, rent seeking is 
found to be negatively associated with education.  Fourth, the more market-based 
economy with a large share of private sector may help curb rent seeking.   
These empirical results are generally consistent with the predictions of our 
theoretic model.  The theoretic model predicts that government officials with greater 
regulatory power are more corrupt because they have more to gain to be corrupt.  
This is verified by findings 1 and 2 mentioned above.  The theoretic model also 
predicts that government officials with higher opportunity costs should be less corrupt.  
This is supported by finding 3 above.  Somehow, the prediction that age affects 
punishment cost and thereby the corruption decision is not clearly supported.  While 
descriptive statistics suggest that bureaucrats approaching retirement age do take 
greater amounts of bribery, the age effect is not significant in the regression.  The 
fact that those in the youngest age group also take very high amounts of bribery is a 
surprising phenomenon that needs to be further studied and explained.       
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Table 1: Age, Gender, and Education and Corruption 
 
 Proportion 
in the 
sample (%)
Average 
Amount in 
RMB’000 
 
(in 
US$’000) 
Age 35 & below 6.15 9032.8 (1158.1)  
35-40 13.08 4691.3 (601.4)  
40-45 23.85 2554.3 (327.5)  
45-50 28.46 5591.1 (716.8) 
50-55 20.00 8208.9 (1052.4)  
55 & up 8.46 10605.1 (1359.6)  
 100%  
Female 8.46 4335.2 (555.8) 
Male 91.54 6054.4 (776.28) 
 100%  
High School & 
Below  
13.08 10258.9
(1315.2)  
Two-year College   24.24 5640.4 (723.1)  
Four-year College 45.45 5740.5 (736.0)  
Graduate 17.69 3487.6 (447.1)  
 100%  
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Table 2: Bureaucratic Rank and Corruption 
  
Proportion 
in the 
sample (%)
Average 
Amount 
in RMB’000 
 
 
(in US$’000) 
Ke  2.31 4064.0 (521.0)  
Chu Minus 10.00 1806.3 (231.6)  
Chu 26.15 4533.6 (581.2)  
Ting(Ju) Minus 30.00 3526.1 (452.1)  
Ting(Ju)   18.46 10370.9 (1329.6)  
Sheng(Bu) Minus, Sheng(Bu) & 
above 
13.77 11289.4 (1447.4)  
 
 100%  
 
Table 3: Major Government Divisions and their Regulatory Power 
 Ministries Power  
Core Governor or Mayors, or Vice governors and 
mayors 
The highest authority; Oversee jobs; Determine personnel appointment 
of other officials 
Commerce Ministry of Commerce, Customs  In charge of international trade, rebate, custom, approve joint ventures, 
and the enterprise licensing 
Finance Ministry of Finance Internal revenue, government budget, budget appropriation, and 
expenditure 
Tax General Administration of Tax Collecting individual and corporate tax 
Construction Ministry of Construction Approval of construction programs 
Transportation Ministry of Transportation Approval of road construction, high way programs, and highway tolls 
Jurisdiction & 
prosecution 
 The Police Department, Persecutors, Judges, 
Ministry of Supervision and Internal 
Discipline 
The power of investigating, policing, prosecuting, and sentencing 
criminals; the internal monitoring of misconducts and corruptions 
Education, Science, 
Cultural, & Health 
Ministry of Education; Ministry of Science; 
Ministry of Culture; Ministry of Health; 
General Administration of Sports (GAS), 
State Administration of Ratio Film and 
Television (SARTT); General Administration 
of Press and Publications (GAPP); State Food 
and Drug Administration (SFDA) 
Overall: Set the policy and provide the service in the corresponding 
areas. Specifically, Ministry of education has the power to determine 
and check the fee and tuition collection in public schools; SARTT and 
GAPP have power to monitor media and inspect press, publications, 
movies and TV programs; SFDA approves new drug and inspect food 
safety. 
Agricultural, 
Forestry, Water & 
Electricity  
Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Water 
Resources; State Forestry Administration;  
Set policy, Survey natural resources; Supervise work in the 
corresponding areas;  
Planning and 
Auditing 
Committee of Economic Development and 
Planning; Ministry of Auditing 
Plan and Guide the policy of national and local economic development; 
Audit the finance of other ministries.   
Table 4: Government Divisions and Corruption 
 Proportion in 
the sample 
(%) 
Average 
Amount 
in RMB’000 
 
(in US$’000) 
Transportation 6.92 15336.1 (1966.2)  
Commerce 3.08 12666.3 (1623.9)  
Tax 3.85 10822.0 (1387.4)  
Core  53.31 6064.1 (777.4)  
Finance 6.15 4688.3 (601.1)  
Education, Science, Cultural, & 
Health 
6.15 2930.7 (375.7)  
Jurisdiction & prosecution 9.23 2662.3 (341.3)  
Construction 5.38 1507.7 (193.3)  
Agricultural, Forestry, water 
&Electricity  
4.61 1365.8 (175.1)  
Planning and Auditing 2.31 448.7 (57.5)  
 100%  
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 Table 5: Determinants of Bribery Amount 
Dep. Var.  
Log(Amount of Accepted 
Bribery) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age     
Age 35 & below 0.495 
(0.641) 
1.315** 
(0.675) 
1.889*** 
(0.721) 
2.003*** 
(0.713) 
Age 35-45 - - - - 
Age 45- 55 0.428 
(0.328) 
-0.152 
(0.324) 
-0.084 
(0.330) 
0.026 
(0.328) 
Age>55  0.619 
(0.558) 
-0.603 
(0.567) 
-0.255 
(0.564) 
-0.450 
(0.577) 
Male -0.490 
(0.533) 
-0.565 
(0.506) 
-0.312 
(0.562) 
-0.301 
(0.594) 
Education     
High School and Below - - - - 
Two Year College -0.673 
(0.500) 
-1.051** 
(0.506) 
-0.974* 
(0.536) 
-0.985* 
(0.527) 
Four-year College  -1.046** 
(0.463) 
-1.560*** 
(0.475) 
-1.467*** 
(0.538) 
-1.455** 
(0.531) 
Graduate -1.327** 
(0.534) 
-2.295*** 
(0.542) 
-2.219*** 
(0.610) 
-2.113*** 
(0.611) 
Rank     
Chu Minus and Ke - - - - 
Chu  1.107** 
(0.560) 
1.114** 
(0.567) 
1.016* 
(0.557) 
Ting(Ju) Minus  1.494*** 
(0.557) 
1.343** 
(0.582) 
1.317** 
(0.576) 
Ting(Ju)   2.379*** 
(0.583) 
2.077*** 
(0.630) 
1.867*** 
(0.639) 
Sheng(Bu) Minus, 
Sheng(Bu) & Above 
 3.275*** 
(0.680) 
2.918*** 
(0.715) 
2.568*** 
(0.752) 
Department     
Transportation   2.496** 
(1.031) 
2.219** 
(1.076) 
Construction   0.710 
(1.067) 
0.352 
(1.113) 
Core   1.572* 
(0.916) 
1.379 
(1.011) 
Education, Science, 
Cultural, & Health 
  0.675 
(1.043) 
0.465 
(1.052) 
Agricultural, Forestry, 
water &Electricity 
  0.901 
(1.062) 
0.841 
(1.095) 
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Jurisdiction & 
prosecution 
  0.663 
(0.991) 
0.373 
(1.069) 
Tax   0.814 
(1.341) 
0.356 
(1.405) 
Commerce   1.274 
(1.210) 
1.292 
(1.256) 
Finance 
 
  2.070* 
(1.106) 
1.690 
(1.221) 
Planning and Auditing   - - 
Provincial Factors     
Per capital GDP     0.001 
(0.429) 
Percentage of Private 
Sector 
   -1.755** 
(0.785) 
GDP growth rate    1.154 
(1.356) 
Constant 6.190*** 
(0.645) 
5.484*** 
(0.752) 
3.870*** 
(1.248) 
4.603*** 
(1.465) 
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.216 0.257 0.287 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *,**, and ***, indicates the significance level at 
10%, 5%, and 1% based on the two tailed tests. 
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Appendix Table: Determinants of Bureaucratic Rank (Ordered Logit Estimates) 
Dep. Var.  Bureaucratic Rank 
Age  
Age 35 & below -2.785*** 
(0.923) 
Age 35-45 - 
Age 45- 55 1.183*** 
(0.360) 
Age>55  2.730*** 
(0.673) 
Male 0.351 
(0.557) 
Education  
High School and Below - 
Two Year College 0.200 
(0.544) 
Four-year College  0.864* 
(0.505) 
Graduate 1.756*** 
(0.590) 
constant 6.190*** 
(0.645) 
Pseudo R2 0.11 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *,**, and ***, indicates the significance level at 
10%, 5%, and 1% based on the two tailed tests. 
 
